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PATERNALISM	AND	POPULATIONS	
	
Introduction	
It	appears	to	be	uncontroversial	that	some	public	health	policies	are	
paternalistic.	Indeed	policies	that	make	it	mandatory	to	wear	seatbelts	or	
motorbike	helmets	are	often	the	first	things	writers	reach	for	when	looking	for	
an	example	of	paternalism	(see	Dworkin,	2011,	p.336;	Coons	and	Weber,	2013,	
p.1).	It	is	a	feature	of	such	policies	that	they	target	groups	of	people.	In	contrast,	
accounts	of	what	paternalism	is	standardly	define	it	in	such	a	way	that	the	target	
of	paternalism	is	an	individual	(see,	for	example,	Feinberg,	1986,	pp.4‐5;	
Dworkin,	1988,	p.123;	Archard,	1990,	p.36;	Beauchamp	and	Childress,	2009,	
p.208;	Dworkin,	2010;	Dworkin,	2011,	pp.361‐2).	In	this	paper	I	will	argue	that	
this	creates	a	problem	both	for	these	accounts	of	what	paternalism	is,	and	for	the	
view	that	because	such	policies	are	paternalistic	they	are	at	least	pro	tanto	
morally	wrong.1		
	
Before	beginning	it	is	worth	explaining	why	this	is	important	given	that	James	
Wilson	has	recently	argued	that	it	is	mistake	to	frame	discussions	of	public	
health	policies	in	terms	of	paternalism	because	there	are	significant	difficulties	
in	determining	whether	a	policy	is	paternalistic	(Wilson,	2011).	Wilson	argues	
that	to	be	paternalistic	a	policy	must	have	a	certain	aim	(benefitting	those	whose	
liberty	is	infringed	by	it)	but	that	in	practice	policies	are	often	introduced	with	
more	than	one	aim.	There	are	various	ways	in	which	we	might	define	
paternalism	to	take	account	of	this:	for	example,	that	a	policy	is	paternalistic	if	at	
least	one	of	its	aims	is	paternalistic,	or	that	it	is	paternalistic	if	its	only	aim	is	
Paternalism	and	Populations	
	 2
paternalistic.	However,	Wilson	argues	that	neither	of	these	options	will	work	and	
also	that	determining	some	position	between	them	is	hard	to	justify	(Wilson,	
2011,	p.272).	This	leaves	it	unclear	whether	any	actual	policies	can	be	said	to	be	
paternalistic.	
	
Wilson’s	argument	here	appears	to	move	too	quickly.	It	does	not	seem	
unreasonable	to	hold	that	a	policy	is	paternalistic	if	it	is	introduced	with	the	sole	
aim	of	benefitting	those	whose	freedom	it	infringes.	Wilson	argues	that	if	this	
were	the	case	then	in	practice	“no	policy	would	be	found	to	be	paternalistic,	as	
there	will	always	be	a	possible	non‐paternalistic	justification	or	motivation	for	
policies	which	have	a	large	paternalistic	commitment.”	(Wilson,	2011,	p.271)	
However,	it	is	unclear	why	the	mere	possibility	that	a	policy	could	have	been	
motived	on	other	grounds	is	a	problem.	On	the	account	I	will	be	advocating	what	
matters	is	the	actual	aim	of	those	who	introduced	the	policy	–	that	they	could	
have	introduced	it	with	a	different	aim	is	to	that	extent	irrelevant.	Furthermore,	
in	practice	there	will	be	cases	where	there	are	reasonable	grounds	to	think	that	a	
policy	is	being	introduced	with	the	sole	aim	of	benefitting	those	whose	freedom	
is	infringed	by	it:	for	example,	those	introducing	the	policy	may	explicitly	state	
that	this	is	their	sole	aim,	or	the	policy	may	be	introduced	with	only	a	single	
target	(such	as	reducing	deaths	from	vehicle	collisions	by	x%)	to	assess	whether	
it	has	met	its	aim.	Whilst	these	do	not	provide	conclusive	evidence	that	a	policy	
has	been	introduced	with	only	one	aim	it	would	not	be	unreasonable	for	an	
opponent	to	argue	that	he	has	good	reason	to	think	that	it	does.	
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A	second	reason	for	addressing	this	topic	despite	Wilson’s	argument	is	strategic.	
I	am	broadly	sympathetic	to	his	idea	that	in	trying	to	determine	whether	to	
adopt	a	policy	we	should	focus	on	whether	the	infringement	in	liberty	is	justified,	
rather	than	on	whether	the	policy	is	paternalistic	or	not.	However,	in	practice	
opponents	of	public	health	policies	sometimes	object	to	them	on	the	grounds	
that	they	are	paternalistic	(and	I	have	argued	that	at	least	in	some	cases	it	may	
be	reasonable	for	them	to	do	so).	To	respond	by	arguing	that	the	infringement	is	
justified	would	be	to	talk	past	them	and	not	really	address	their	objection	at	all.	
As	such,	in	this	paper	I	will	start	from	a	position	that	accepts	that	the	kinds	of	
policy	I	am	concerned	with	are,	as	at	least	some	of	their	opponents	claim,	
paternalistic.		
	
The	paper	proceeds	in	three	stages.	In	the	next	section	I	will	start	by	explaining	
the	key	features	that	appear	in	accounts	of	what	paternalism	is,	and	then	explain	
the	problem	that	apparently	paternalistic	public	health	policies	raise	for	those	
accounts.	The	paper	then	considers	two	ways	in	which	one	might	try	to	respond	
to	this	problem.	One	possible	response,	to	be	considered	in	section	two,	is	to	
rethink	what	the	aim	of	these	public	health	policies	is.	I	will	argue	that	this	will	
only	work	for	some	cases	and	so	an	alternative	is	needed.	This	response,	the	
focus	of	section	three,	argues	that	in	order	to	accommodate	the	claim	that	things	
like	mandatory	seatbelt	policies	are	paternalistic	we	need	to	allow	that	the	target	
of	a	paternalistic	action	or	policy	can	be	a	group	not	just	an	individual.	Because	
many	standard	accounts	of	what	paternalism	is	do	not	accommodate	this,	I	will	
argue	that	such	accounts	need	to	be	modified.	Furthermore,	making	this	change	
requires	us	to	take	the	target	of	the	interference	or	imposition	that	paternalistic	
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policies	involve	to	be	the	group	rather	than	the	individual.	This	change,	or	so	I	
will	argue,	has	important	implications	for	questions	about	the	normative	
significance	of	paternalism.		
	
1.	The	problem	
There	are	a	number	of	different	accounts	of	what	paternalism	is	in	the	literature.	
Whilst	there	are	important	differences	between	these	accounts,	in	general	they	
take	there	to	be	two	(or	in	some	cases	three)	features	that	are	necessary	for	
something	to	be	a	case	of	paternalism.	In	this	section	I	will	start	by	saying	a	bit	
about	each	of	these,	before	going	on	to	explain	how	accounts	with	these	features	
struggle	to	explain	why	some	apparently	uncontroversial	paternalistic	actions	
(such	as	making	the	wearing	of	seat	belts	mandatory)	are	paternalistic.	
	
The	first	feature	that	an	act	has	to	have	for	it	to	count	as	paternalistic	is	that	it	is	
done	with	the	aim	of	benefitting	(where	‘benefit’	should	be	taken	to	include	
preventing	harm)	the	person	on	whom	it	is	imposed.2	Actions	done	with	that	aim	
may	not	in	fact	do	so,	and	actions	that	do	provide	a	benefit	need	not	have	been	
undertaken	with	the	aim	of	providing	that	benefit.	For	example,	banning	
smoking	in	public	places	has	in	many	cases	been	argued	for	on	the	basis	that	it	is	
needed	to	protect	other	people	from	being	harmed	by	smokers.	Smokers	may	
benefit	but	this	is	not	generally	thought	to	be	enough	to	make	it	paternalistic	–	in	
contrast	to	the	case	where	the	same	policy	is	introduced	with	the	aim	of	
benefiting	smokers.	Examples	like	this	would	create	problems	were	we	to	
characterize	paternalism	in	such	a	way	that	for	something	to	be	paternalistic	it	
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must	actually	benefit	another	person,	rather	than	aim	at	benefiting	them.	For	this	
reason	I	will	not	be	considering	such	accounts	here.	
	
Not	all	cases	in	which	one	person	aims	to	benefit	another	are	paternalistic	–	for	
example,	a	surgeon	who	carries	out	an	operation	with	the	valid	consent	of	her	
patient	aims	to	benefit	that	patient	but	would	not	be	thought	to	be	acting	
paternalistically	when	she	does	so.	As	such,	it	is	generally	held	that	another	
feature	(or	features)	is	needed	if	an	act	is	to	be	paternalistic.	This	can	be	spelt	
out	in	a	variety	of	different	ways.	For	example,	Gerald	Dworkin	takes	it	that	the	
paternalist	interferes	with	the	other	person	without	their	consent	(Dworkin,	
2010),	James	Childress	takes	it	that	in	acting	the	paternalist	does	not	acquiesce	
in	the	preferences,	choices,	or	actions	of	the	other	person	(Childress,	2007,	
p.223),	David	Archard	takes	it	that	the	paternalist	usurps	the	choice	made	by	the	
other	person	(Archard,	1990,	p.36)	and	Ronald	Dworkin	takes	it	that	the	
paternalist	imposes	a	decision	on	the	other	person	contrary	to	that	person’s	own	
sense	of	what	is	good	for	them	(Dworkin,	2011,	pp.361‐2).	As	it	is	not	this	
feature	(or	features)	of	the	accounts	I	am	considering	that	will	be	called	into	
question	in	what	follows	I	will	for	the	most	part	simply	refer	to	this	as	a	
requirement	that	for	an	act	to	be	paternalistic	it	must	in	some	sense	impose	a	
change	on	the	other	person.3	
	
If	this	is	what	paternalism	is	then	it	is	not	hard	to	see	why	it	is	thought	to	be	pro	
tanto	wrong.	Paternalism	denies	those	affected	by	it	the	chance	to	make	their	
own	decisions	about	what	is	important	to	them	and	how	to	live	their	life,	and	as	
such	fails	to	accord	them	the	respect	they	are	owed.	This	point	has	sometimes	
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been	made	in	terms	of	a	person’s	desires	about	how	their	life	should	go	–	Gerald	
Dworkin,	for	example,	expresses	this	when	he	writes,	“We	desire	to	be	
recognized	by	others	as	the	kind	of	creature	capable	of	determining	our	own	
destiny.	Our	own	sense	of	self‐respect	is	tied	to	the	respect	of	others	…”	
(Dworkin,	1988,	p.112;	see	also	Berlin,	1969,	p.131).	Alternatively	it	can	be	made	
in	terms	of	our	interest	in	being	treated	as	someone	to	whom	these	things	are	
important	(Dworkin,	1988,	pp.108‐113;	Owens,	2012,	pp.167‐168,	Hausman,	
2012,	p.90).	To	fail	to	do	this	is	both	to	fail	to	recognize	that	we	are	autonomous	
and	to	treat	us	as	though	we	are	not	an	equal	moral	agent	(see	Dworkin,	1988,	
p.110).	If	this	is	right,	then	it	seems	that	there	are	moral	reasons	not	to	introduce	
paternalistic	public	health	policies.	What	makes	those	policies	paternalistic	
would	also	make	them	pro	tanto	wrong.	
	
Whilst	at	first	sight	it	might	appear	that	policies	like	mandatory	seatbelt	policies	
meet	these	requirements,	closer	examination	will	show	that	they	do	not.	The	
benefit	from	wearing	a	seatbelt	is	that	it	protects	you	against	being	seriously	
injured	or	killed	in	a	crash.	But	not	everyone	who	wears	a	seatbelt	will	benefit	in	
this	way.	There	will	be	some	people	who	wear	a	seatbelt	but	are	never	involved	
in	a	crash	or	any	other	incident	in	which	their	seatbelt	protects	them.	On	the	
other	hand,	there	will	be	some	people	who,	although	they	wear	a	seatbelt,	are	
nevertheless	killed	or	seriously	injured	in	a	crash.	Their	seatbelt	in	these	cases	
did	not	protect	them	when	they	needed	it.	Because	of	this	when	introducing	a	
mandatory	seatbelt	policy	a	policy	maker	will	generally	not	be	aiming	to	provide	
this	benefit	to	everyone	affected	by	the	policy	–	where	they	know	that	acting	in	a	
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certain	way	will	not	achieve	some	goal	a	policy	maker	cannot,	on	pain	of	severe	
irrationality,	be	aiming	to	achieve	that	goal	when	she	acts	in	that	way.		
	
Recall,	however,	that	to	be	paternalistic	an	action	must	be	done	with	the	aim	of	
benefitting	the	person	on	whom	it	is	imposed.	It	now	seems	that	in	the	case	of	
mandatory	seatbelt	policies	this	is	not	the	case.	The	policy	maker	does	not	aim	to	
benefit	all	those	on	whom	she	imposes	the	requirement	to	wear	a	seatbelt.	
Furthermore,	it	also	turns	out	not	to	be	the	case	that	there	is	any	individual	of	
whom	it	is	true	that	in	introducing	the	policy	the	policy	maker	aims	to	benefit	
them.	To	see	this	suppose	that	the	government’s	aim	in	introducing	a	mandatory	
seatbelt	policy	is	to	reduce	the	number	of	vehicle	users	who	are	killed	or	
seriously	injured.	Now	consider	a	randomly	selected	member	of	the	population	–	
call	him	Bill.	As	it	happens	Bill	gets	killed	in	car	crash	whilst	wearing	his	seatbelt,	
and	so	wearing	the	seatbelt	does	not	benefit	him.	Does	this	in	any	way	mean	that	
the	policy	has	not	achieved	its	aim?	The	short	answer	is	that	it	needn’t.	That	is,	
the	policy	may	well	achieve	its	aim	(which	recall	is	to	reduce	the	numbers	killed,	
not	to	reduce	them	to	zero	–	something	that	such	a	policy	cannot	do)	even	
though	Bill	does	not	benefit.	But,	if	the	policy	can	achieve	its	aim	without	it	
benefiting	Bill,	then	benefitting	Bill	is	not	part	of	the	aim	of	the	policy.	Recall,	
however,	that	Bill	was	any	randomly	picked	member	of	the	population.	As	such,	
what	is	true	of	him	will	be	true	of	every	other	member	of	the	population	too.	
	
Effectively	it	does	not	matter	in	terms	of	achieving	the	aim	of	things	like	
mandatory	seatbelt	policies	who	benefits	from	them,	as	long	as	some	people	do.	
But	this	means	that	benefiting	any	particular	individual	is	not	part	of	the	aim	of	
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the	policy.	The	policy,	we	might	say,	aims	at	benefiting	statistical	individuals,	not	
identifiable	individuals.	It	would	appear	to	follow	from	this	that	there	is	no	one	
who	is	affected	by	the	mandatory	seatbelt	policy	of	whom	it	is	true	that	the	
policy	aimed	at	benefiting	them.	But	in	that	case	it	does	not	seem	as	if	the	policy	
treats	anyone	paternalistically.	This	creates	a	problem	for	the	accounts	of	
paternalism	that	I	have	been	using	here.	A	policy	that	introduces	a	requirement	
that	vehicle	users	wear	a	seatbelt	in	order	to	reduce	deaths	and	serious	injuries	
among	vehicle	users	looks	to	be	paternalistic.	But	it	now	seems	that	on	current	
accounts	of	what	paternalism	is	this	is	not	the	case.	
	
One	possible	response	here	would	be	simply	to	bite	the	bullet	and	accept	that	the	
kinds	of	policy	I	have	been	talking	about	are	not	paternalistic.	This	though	has	
significant	costs	–	the	examples	I	have	been	using	are	fairly	generally	held	to	be	
uncontroversial	cases	of	paternalism.	An	alternative	is	to	argue	that	I	am	wrong	
to	deny	that	everybody	benefits	from	the	introduction	of	a	policy	that	requires	
people	to	wear	seatbelts.	I	will	consider	this	option	in	the	next	section.	As	we	will	
see	whilst	this	may	cover	some	instances	of	the	kind	of	policy	I	am	concerned	
with	here	it	cannot	cover	them	all.		
	
2.	Rethinking	the	Benefit	
In	setting	out	the	problem	above	I	took	it	that	the	benefit	of	wearing	a	seatbelt	is	
being	protected	from	death	or	serious	injury	in	a	collision.	But	that	isn’t	the	only	
option	–	for	example,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	benefit	of	wearing	a	seatbelt	is	
having	a	lower	chance	of	being	killed	or	seriously	injured	in	a	collision.	Because	
this	is	a	benefit	received	by	everyone	who	wears	a	seatbelt	as	the	result	of	a	
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mandatory	requirement	to	do	so	it	might	appear	that	we	can	avoid	the	problem	
set	out	above.		
	
For	this	proposal	to	work	it	must	be	the	case	that	having	a	lower	chance	of	death	
or	serious	injury	is	a	benefit.	But	some	care	is	needed	in	spelling	out	the	benefit	
here	if	this	is	to	be	the	case.	Consider	a	person	who	is	killed	whilst	wearing	his	
seatbelt	(like	Bill	in	the	example	above).	If	having	a	lower	chance	of	death	or	
serious	injury	in	a	car	crash	is	a	benefit,	and	wearing	a	seatbelt	provides	this	
benefit,	then	it	must	be	the	case	that	Bill	benefits	from	wearing	a	seatbelt.	But	
this	sounds	wrong.	Bill’s	seatbelt	does	nothing	to	benefit	him	–	he	would	have	
been	no	worse	off	had	he	not	worn	it.		
	
However,	in	expressing	the	thought	that	Bill	does	not	benefit	from	wearing	a	
seatbelt	we	judged	this	from	a	position	after	the	event	(in	this	case	Bill’s	crash)	
where	we	know	what	happened.	In	contrast,	when	we	say	that	someone	is	better	
off	having	a	lower	chance	of	death	or	serious	injury	we	are	making	that	judgment	
before	the	event	(in	this	case	at	the	time	Bill	starts	his	journey).	Before	he	sets	
out	we	do	not	know	whether	or	not	Bill	will	crash	and	if	so	whether	his	seatbelt	
will	save	him.	But	we	do,	it	seems,	know	that	his	seatbelt	may	save	him	and	that	
is	enough	to	show	that	he	will	be	better	off	(given	what	we	know	at	that	time)	if	
he	wears	a	seatbelt.	That	is,	when	determining	what	is	better	for	someone	in	a	
case	like	this	it	is	natural,	as	John	Broome	points	out,	to	use	the	probabilities	of	
different	outcomes	pertaining	at	the	time	of	the	decision	(Broome,	1991,	p.225).	
It	is	this	that	makes	it	seem	plausible	to	say	that	having	a	lower	chance	of	serious	
injury	or	death	is	a	benefit.	
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What	is	needed,	then,	in	order	to	capture	the	idea	that	everyone	benefits	from	
wearing	a	seatbelt	is	a	way	of	characterizing	this	benefit	such	that	it	is	tied	to	the	
time	of	the	action.	One	way	to	do	that	is	to	argue	that	the	benefit	to	each	
individual	affected	by	a	mandatory	seatbelt	policy	is	that	it	brings	it	about	that	
they	do	something	that	has	a	higher	expected	utility	than	they	would	have	done	
in	the	absence	of	that	policy	–	where	the	expected	utility	of	an	option	is	
calculated	by	a	cost‐benefit	analysis	taking	account	of	the	probabilities	of	the	
different	outcomes	that	could	arise	from	taking	that	option.	In	this	way	it	seems	
that	we	can	avoid	the	worry	that	people	like	Bill	in	our	example	do	not	benefit	
from	being	required	to	wear	a	seatbelt.	Requiring	Bill	to	wear	a	seatbelt	does	
bring	it	about	that	he	does	something	that	has	a	higher	expected	utility	than	
would	have	been	the	case	if	he	had	not	been	required	to	do	so	(as	then	he	would	
not	have	worn	his	seatbelt).4	It	might	appear	that	in	this	way	we	can	get	what	we	
have	been	looking	for	–	an	account	according	to	which	everyone	who	wears	a	
seatbelt	as	a	result	of	the	introduction	of	the	mandatory	seatbelt	policy	benefits	
from	doing	so.	
	
This,	however,	would	be	to	move	too	fast.	Whilst	in	some	cases,	and	the	seatbelt	
example	may	be	one	of	these,	it	may	be	that	everyone	(given	their	own	values)	
would	have	a	higher	expected	utility	by	acting	in	one	way	(driving	with	a	
seatbelt)	than	in	another	(driving	without	a	seatbelt),	in	others	things	are	far	less	
clear‐cut.	Consider	the	case	of	making	it	mandatory	to	wear	a	helmet	when	
riding	a	motorbike	where	this	is	done	to	benefit	bike	riders.	Those	who	oppose	
policies	of	this	type	may	argue	that	wearing	a	helmet	would	deprive	them	of	
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things	that	are	of	value	to	them	–	such	as	the	sense	of	freedom	that	comes	with	
riding	without	a	helmet.	If	they	value	these	things	highly	enough	then	it	could	
turn	out	that	wearing	a	helmet	when	riding	their	motorbike	would	not	have	
higher	expected	utility	for	them	than	riding	without	a	helmet	(see	Coons	and	
Weber,	2013,	p.9).	As	such,	they	would	not	benefit	from	the	introduction	of	a	
mandatory	helmet	policy	in	the	sense	of	‘benefit’	that	is	at	stake	here.	
	
However,	this	may	not	matter	for	our	purposes	here.	I	have	already	argued	that	
we	should	not	take	it	that	for	an	action	to	be	paternalistic	it	must	benefit	its	
target,	rather	what	matters	is	that	the	policy	maker	be	aiming	to	benefit	the	
target.	If	the	policy	maker	judges	that	people	will	all	have	a	higher	expected	
utility	if	they	wear	a	seatbelt	when	driving	or	a	helmet	when	on	a	motorbike,	
then	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	in	introducing	a	policy	to	make	wearing	a	
seatbelt	or	helmet	compulsory	she	is	aiming	to	benefit	all	of	those	whose	
behavior	is	changed	by	the	policy	on	the	account	of	‘benefit’	outlined	above.	In	
that	way	it	would	appear	that	the	policy	does	fit	the	first,	benefit	based,	criterion	
for	something	to	be	paternalistic.		
	
It	also	seems	that	such	a	policy	will	fit	the	second	criterion	for	something	to	be	
paternalistic	outlined	above	in	at	least	some	cases.	As	we	have	seen	the	policy	
maker	on	this	account	acts	to	bring	it	about	that	each	individual	does	what	she	
(the	policy	maker)	judges	to	be	good	for	him	(in	the	sense	of	having	a	higher	
expected	utility).	Where	this	is	done	without	the	voluntary	agreement	of	the	
person	affected,	it	does	appear	that	the	policy	maker	interferes	with	the	other	
person	against	that	person’s	will	and	does	so	without	his	consent	(as	on	Gerald	
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Dworkin’s	account	–	Dworkin,	2010),	and	imposes	a	decision	on	them	contrary	
to	their	own	sense	of	what	is	good	for	them	(as	required	on	Ronald	Dworkin’s	
account	–	see	Dworkin,	2011).	Similarly	in	acting	in	this	way	she	is	not	
acquiescing	with	the	actual	preferences,	choices	and	actions	of	the	other	person	
(as	required	on	James	Childress’	account	–	see	Childress,	2007).	
	
That	paternalistic	policies	have	these	features	has	been	pointed	out	before.	For	
example,	N.	Scott	Arnold	writes	that,	“Whatever	their	ultimate	goals,	the	
proximate	goal	of	[paternalistic]	laws	and	regulations	is	to	get	people	to	do	what	
is	in	their	best	interests,	as	state	officials	see	it.”	(Arnold,	2009,	p.109)	What	is	
different	is	the	way	that	I	have	spelt	out	what	it	means	to	talk	about	‘best	
interests’	or	‘benefits’	in	this	context.	This	difference,	however,	means	that	the	
account	developed	here	will	not	be	able	to	explain	why	some	policies	that	appear	
paternalistic	are	paternalistic.	All	that	it	shows	is	that	if	policy	makers	act	with	
the	aim	of	benefitting	everyone	on	whom	their	policy	is	imposed	(by	bringing	it	
about	that	people	do	what	has	a	higher	expected	utility	at	the	time	they	act),	then	
that	policy	will	be	paternalistic.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	this	will	cover	all	
public	health	policies	that	appear	intuitively	to	be	paternalistic.	This	is	because	it	
relies	on	a	particular	account	of	what	the	policy	maker’s	aims	in	introducing	such	
policies	are.	More	specifically	it	relies	on	the	idea	that	in	introducing	public	
health	policies	policy	makers’	aims	are	to	benefit	individuals	not	populations.	To	
explain	why	policies	with	the	latter	type	of	aim	would	be	paternalistic	a	different	
approach	is	needed.	It	is	to	this	that	I	want	to	turn	in	the	next	section.	
	
3.	Moving	Entirely	to	the	Group	Level	
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The	problem	identified	in	this	paper	is	that	whilst	on	current	accounts	of	
paternalism	an	act	is	only	paternalistic	if	it	is	done	with	the	aim	of	benefitting	the	
person	on	whom	it	is	imposed,	many	public	health	policies	are	not	introduced	
with	the	aim	of	benefiting	any	particular	individual	on	whom	they	are	imposed.	
At	its	heart	this	problem	stems	from	the	fact	that,	as	Angus	Dawson	and	Marcel	
Verweij	put	it,	many	public	health	policies	“aim	to	realise	health	benefits	at	a	
group	or	population	level.”	(Dawson	and	Verweij,	2007,	p.7)	If	the	aim	is	
irreducibly	to	benefit	the	group	(rather	than	the	individuals	in	the	group)	then	
the	only	way	for	this	to	be	paternalistic	is	if	the	imposition	is	also	on	the	group	
(rather	than	on	the	individuals	who	make	up	the	group).	In	this	section	I	want	to	
consider	whether	an	account	of	this	type	can	be	made	to	work.	
	
In	everyday	life	we	readily	talk	about	things	that	benefit	or	harm	groups	of	
people	(where	these	can	be	picked	out	in	different	ways).	How	we	conceptualize	
this	benefit	may	depend	on	how	we	conceptualize	the	relevant	group	–	for	
example,	whether	we	think	of	it	as	merely	a	group	of	people	who	share	some	
feature	(say	that	they	ride	motorbikes)	or	as	a	community	which	can	thrive,	or	
decline,	in	its	own	right.	However	we	do	this	we	may	hold	that	collectively	a	
group	benefits	if	some	members	of	that	group	live	longer	or	avoid	serious	injury,	
or	if	the	average	utility	of	the	group	goes	up,	or	if	there	is	less	inequality	within	
the	group.	Indeed,	if	we	are	to	hold	that	policies	can	aim	at	improving	collective	
well‐being,	then	something	along	these	lines	must	be	correct.	As	we	have	seen	
things	like	mandatory	seatbelt	policies	need	not	aim	to	benefit	everyone	who	is	
required	to	wear	a	seatbelt	as	the	result	of	introducing	that	policy,	and	nor	is	it	
the	case	that	there	need	be	any	individual	of	whom	it	is	true	that	the	policy	aims	
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to	benefit	that	person.	But	such	a	policy	nevertheless	does	seem	to	be	aiming	a	
providing	a	benefit,	and	the	group	is	the	only	thing	left	that	it	could	be	aiming	to	
benefit	(for	an	account	of	different	ways	of	thinking	about	collective	benefits	see	
Dawson,	2011,	pp.14‐17).	In	saying	this	it	is	important	to	note	that	it	need	not	be	
the	case	that	the	group	that	the	policy	aims	to	benefit	is	a	community	(in	any	rich	
sense	of	community)	or	self‐governing	group.	In	the	case	of	mandatory	seatbelt	
policies	the	group	that	the	policy	aims	to	benefit	are	those	who	travel	by	vehicle.	
	
Before	continuing	there	are	two	possible	objections	that	need	to	be	considered	
at	this	point.	The	first	is	that	talk	of	benefiting	a	group	is	merely	metaphorical	–	it	
is	only	individuals	who	can	benefit,	and	there	is	nothing	over	and	above	the	
individual	that	could	benefit.5	This	is	not	the	place	to	enter	the	debate	about	
whether	groups	can	benefit.	Instead	I	want	simply	to	point	out	that	those	who	
hold	this	type	of	highly	individualistic	position	–	groups	are	nothing	more	that	
mere	aggregations	of	individuals	and	only	individuals	can	benefit	or	be	harmed	–	
cannot	hold	that	public	health	policies	that	aim	at	group	level	effects	are	wrong	
because	they	are	paternalistic.	This	is	because	if	they	deny	the	possibility	of	a	
group	benefiting	then	the	arguments	in	the	previous	sections	of	this	paper	show	
that	such	policies	–	including	policies	like	making	it	mandatory	to	wear	a	helmet	
when	riding	a	motorbike	–	are	not	paternalistic.	As	we	have	seen	such	policies	do	
not	aim	to	benefit	those	identifiable	individuals	affected	by	them.	
	
The	second	objection	that	might	be	raised	is	that	this	position	will	collapse	into	
that	which	we	considered	in	the	last	section.6	In	this	section	I	am	taking	it	that	
the	policy	maker’s	aim	in	introducing	a	mandatory	seat	belt	policy	is	to	reduce	
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the	numbers	of	people	who	are	killed	or	seriously	injured	in	car	crashes.	The	
way	it	does	this	is	by	reducing	the	chance	that	those	travelling	by	car	are	killed	
or	seriously	injured,	and	hence	by	increasing	their	expected	utility.	Because	of	
this	it	may	appear	incoherent	to	aim	at	the	former	without	aiming	at	the	latter.	
There	are	two	things	to	say	in	response	to	this.	The	first	is	that	even	if	it	were	
incoherent	to	aim	at	reducing	the	numbers	killed	or	seriously	injured	within	a	
group	without	also	aiming	to	increase	the	expected	utility	of	some	members	of	
that	group,	there	is	nothing	incoherent	about	aiming	to	reduce	the	numbers	
killed	or	seriously	injured	within	the	group	whilst	not	aiming	to	increase	the	
expected	utility	of	every	member	of	the	group.	The	policy	maker	might,	for	
example,	think	that	making	it	mandatory	for	all	bike	riders	to	wear	helmets	
would	lower	the	expected	utility	of	some	riders	whilst	increasing	the	expected	
utility	of	others	–	whilst	not	knowing	which	are	which.	Such	a	policy	would	still	
appear	to	be	paternalistic	if	it	were	not	agreed	to	by	the	riders.	Second,	even	if	it	
were	the	case	that	reducing	the	numbers	killed	or	seriously	injured	and	
increasing	the	expected	utility	of	every	group	member	were	the	same	thing,	it	
would	not	follow	that	it	was	incoherent	to	introduce	a	policy	with	the	aim	of	
bringing	about	the	former	but	not	with	the	aim	of	bringing	about	the	latter.		This	
could	be	the	case,	for	instance,	if	a	policy	maker	did	not	know	these	were	the	
same.	In	that	case	it	might	be	true	that	in	introducing	a	mandatory	helmet	policy	
a	policy	maker	was	aiming	to	reduce	the	numbers	killed	in	road	accidents,	but	
not	true	that	in	introducing	that	policy	she	was	aiming	to	increase	the	expected	
utility	of	all	those	affected	by	it.	This	is	because	‘aiming	at’	as	it	is	being	used	in	
discussions	of	paternalism	is	an	intensional	context	–	what	we	are	aiming	at	in	
acting	in	a	particular	way	depends	on	our	beliefs.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	a	
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person	could	act	with	the	aim	of	benefitting	Superman	but	not	with	the	aim	of	
benefitting	Clark	Kent	–	even	though	these	are	one	and	the	same	individual.	
	
If	a	group	can	benefit	from	a	particular	policy	it	also	seems	that	such	a	policy	
could	be	imposed	on	a	group.	However,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	
imposing	a	policy	on	a	group	without	the	agreement	of	the	group	is	not	the	same	
thing	as	imposing	something	on	each	individual	member	of	that	group	without	
that	person’s	agreement.	Similarly,	one	can	acquiesce	with	the	preferences	of	a	
group	without	acquiescing	with	the	preferences	of	each	member	of	the	group.	To	
talk	about	the	preferences	of	a	group	or	the	agreement	of	a	group	is	to	talk	about	
something	that	is	a	feature	of	the	group	as	a	whole.	A	group,	for	example,	can	
agree	to	something	even	if	there	are	some	members	of	the	group	who	do	not	
agree	to	it.	The	preferences	of	a	group	(as	a	group)	may	not	align	with	the	
preferences	of	each	member	of	the	group.	
	
An	example	may	help	to	make	this	clearer.	Suppose	the	authorities	that	run	an	
ice	hockey	league	introduce	a	requirement	that	all	players	wear	helmets	as	a	way	
to	reduce	injuries	to	the	players.	If	they	do	this	without	the	agreement	of	the	
players	as	a	group	then	this	looks	to	be	paternalistic.	However,	if	the	policy	is	
introduced	with	the	agreement	of	the	players	as	a	body	on	the	account	given	
here	this	will	not	be	paternalistic.	In	the	first	case	the	policy	is	imposed	on	the	
players	and	disregards	(either	because	it	does	not	bother	to	find	out	or	because	
it	overrides)	their	preferences.	In	the	latter	it	is	not	imposed	as	it	is	done	with	
the	agreement	of	the	players	as	a	body,	and	takes	account	of	their	preferences	
(and	hence	does	not	disregard	them).	This	is	so	even	if,	as	may	well	be	the	case,	
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not	all	players	agree	with	the	requirement	to	wear	helmets	and	some	would	
prefer	not	to	wear	them.	Those	players	are	not	treated	paternalistically	as	the	
policy	is	not	aimed	at	benefiting	them;	it	aims	at	benefiting	the	players	as	a	
group.	And	the	players	as	a	group	have	voluntarily	agreed	to	the	policy.7	
	
What	this	example	shows	is	that	there	can	be	acts	or	policies	that	(1)	aim	to	
benefit	some	group,	and	(2)	do	so	by	imposing	a	change	on	that	group	without	
their	agreement,	or	otherwise	by	disregarding	the	preferences	of	the	group.	If	we	
describe	such	acts	or	policies	as	paternalistic,	then	we	can	easily	see	why	things	
like	mandatory	seatbelt	and	helmet	policies	are	paternalistic.	For	example,	
taking	this	approach	we	can	argue	that	a	policy	that	makes	it	mandatory	for	
motorbike	riders	to	wear	a	helmet	aims	to	benefit	motorbike	riders	as	a	group.	
Such	a	policy	will	be	paternalistic	if	it	is	imposed	on	the	riders	as	a	group.	In	that	
case	the	policy	maker	aims	to	bring	it	about	that	the	group	do	what	she	thinks	is	
best	for	them	as	a	group,	and	takes	it	that	she	does	not	need	to	defer	to	their	
judgment	as	a	group	about	this	(and	hence	does	not	need	either	to	find	out	what	
they	think,	nor	to	acquiesce	with	their	choices	where	she	does	know	this).	
	
Such	an	account	of	paternalism	is	structurally	similar	to	the	accounts	of	
paternalism	with	which	we	started.	However,	as	noted	in	the	introduction	these	
accounts	define	what	paternalism	is	in	terms	that	mean	it	is	only	possible	to	
treat	a	person	or	individual	paternalistically.	To	accommodate	paternalism	
aimed	at	benefiting	a	group	such	accounts	would	need	to	be	altered.	One	way	in	
which	this	could	be	done	is	to	say	that	those	accounts	as	they	stand	are	accounts	
of	what	is	sufficient,	but	not	necessary,	for	something	to	be	paternalistic,	and	
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then	to	supplement	them	with	the	account	outlined	here.	An	alternative	would	
be	to	replace	terms	such	as		‘person’	or	‘individual’	in	the	accounts	as	they	stand	
with	a	broader	term	that	covers	both	individuals	(or	persons)	and	groups.	If	we	
are	to	accommodate	the	idea	that	policies	such	as	mandatory	seatbelt	policies	
are	paternalistic	then	some	such	alteration	to	current	accounts	of	paternalism	
will	be	needed.	
	
This	change,	however,	has	important	implications	for	the	normative	status	of	
paternalism	when	directed	at	groups.	When	setting	out	what	paternalism	is	
above	I	argued	that	what	made	paternalism	pro	tanto	wrong	was	one	of	the	
features	that	made	it	paternalistic.	This	was	that	when	the	paternalist	acts	to	
bring	it	about	that	the	other	person	does	what	she	(the	paternalist)	thinks	is	best	
for	them	she	does	so	in	a	way	that	indicates	that	she	believes	that	she	does	not	
need	to	defer	to	their	judgment	in	this	matter	(and	hence	does	not	need	either	to	
find	out	what	they	think,	nor	to	acquiesce	with	their	choices	where	she	does	
know	this).	In	acting	in	this	way	I	argued	the	paternalist	fails	to	treat	the	other	
person	as	an	equal	moral	agent,	and	fails	to	give	adequate	weight	to	their	
interest	in	being	recognized	as	someone	to	whom	it	is	important	that	they	run	
their	own	life.	
	
Whilst	when	it	comes	to	groups	I	have	argued	that	structurally	similar	features	
are	what	makes	an	act	or	policy	paternalistic	in	this	case	it	will	not,	in	general,	
follow	that	such	paternalism	is	pro	tanto	wrong.	This	is	because	with	some	
exceptions	the	group	as	a	group	is	neither	a	moral	agent,	nor	does	it	have	an	
interest	in	being	recognized	as	a	body	for	which	it	is	important	that	it	run	its	own	
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affairs.	Neither	the	group	of	motorbike	riders	nor	the	group	of	vehicle	users,	for	
example,	is	a	body	of	this	type.	They	do	not	collectively	run	their	own	affairs	and	
it	would	not	set	back	their	interests	(as	a	group)	not	to	recognize	their	authority	
to	do	so	–	they	have	no	such	authority.	Furthermore,	these	groups	are	not	
collective	moral	agents,	and	so	are	not	wronged	by	a	failure	to	treat	them	as	
moral	agents.	That	is,	what	made	paternalism	pro	tanto	wrong	in	the	case	where	
the	target	was	a	competent	individual	does	not	in	general	make	it	pro	tanto	
wrong	in	cases	where	the	target	is	a	group.		
	
This	may	become	clearer	when	we	consider	the	exceptions	to	this	general	point.	
There	are	some	groups	that	are	self‐governing	and	for	which	it	is	important	that	
they	as	a	group	are	allowed	to	run	their	own	affairs,	and	others	that	would	be	
wronged	by	having	a	policy	imposed	on	them	because	someone	else	thinks	that	
they	as	a	group	would	be	better	off	if	it	was	(for	example,	where	the	group	is	a	
minority	ethnic	group	and	the	activity	is	something	central	to	their	culture).	In	
these	cases	what	makes	an	action	paternalistic	when	directed	at	the	group	would	
be	pro	tanto	wrong	for	the	same	reasons	that	it	would	be	pro	tanto	wrong	when	
directed	at	a	competent	individual.	But	as	we	have	seen	many	groups,	including	
the	ones	that	have	been	my	focus	in	this	paper,	are	not	like	this.	In	saying	this	I	
am	not	saying	that	paternalistic	acts	or	policies	aimed	at	these	groups	is	always	
morally	permissible.	A	policy	that	requires	riders	to	wear	a	helmet	interferes	
with	the	rider’s	freedom	and	may	be	wrong	on	those	grounds	(I	make	no	claim	
about	this	either	way).	My	claim	is	simply	that	if	this	is	wrong	what	makes	it	
wrong	is	not	what	makes	it	a	case	of	paternalism.	As	such,	whilst	in	these	kinds	
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of	cases	whether	a	policy	is	justified	requires	careful	argument,	whether	it	is	
paternalistic	or	not	does	not	have	any	place	in	such	an	argument.	
	
Conclusion	
In	this	paper	I	have	taken	it	that	public	health	policies	such	as	making	it	
mandatory	to	wear	a	seatbelt,	or	a	helmet,	where	this	is	done	to	reduce	the	
numbers	of	car	or	motorbike	users	who	are	killed	or	seriously	injured	in	crashes	
can	reasonably	be	taken	to	be	paternalistic.	My	argument	has	been	that	current	
accounts	of	paternalism	do	not	support	such	a	claim.	Such	policies	do	not	aim	to	
benefit	all	of	those	on	whom	they	are	imposed,	and	there	is	no	individual	of	
whom	it	is	true	that	in	requiring	that	individual	to	wear	a	helmet	or	seatbelt	the	
policy	maker	aims	at	benefiting	him.	As	such,	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	is	any	
person	who	is	required	to	act	differently	as	the	result	of	introducing	these	types	
of	policy	where	this	requirement	is	introduced	as	a	way	of	benefiting	them.	
	
There	are	two	ways	in	which	one	might	seek	to	address	this	problem	whilst	
holding	onto	the	idea	that	policies	of	this	type	are	paternalistic.	The	first	is	to	
recharacterise	what	benefit	the	policy	aims	to	produce.	As	I	argued	in	section	
two	there	may	well	be	some	situations	in	which	this	strategy	will	work	–	for	
example,	where	we	take	the	benefit	to	be	bringing	it	about	that	the	person	does	
something	with	a	higher	expected	utility.	However,	it	is	implausible	to	think	that	
this	will	cover	all	public	health	policies	because	it	relies	on	a	particular	account	
of	what	the	policy	maker’s	aim	is	in	introducing	them:	an	account	that	may	be	
false.	If	the	policy	maker	simply	aims	at	reducing	the	numbers	of	vehicle	users	
who	are	killed	or	seriously	injured,	for	example,	an	alternative	approach	is	
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needed.	This	requires	that,	as	I	argued	in	section	three,	we	take	the	paternalist	to	
be	aiming	at	benefiting	the	group	as	a	group	–	which	in	turn	requires	us	to	
rethink	what	it	is	to	impose	the	policy	on	the	group	or	to	fail	to	acquiesce	with	
their	preferences.	Furthermore,	once	we	have	done	this	we	can	see	that	the	
features	that	appear	to	make	paternalism	pro	tanto	wrong	when	the	target	of	the	
paternalism	is	an	individual,	will	not	make	it	pro	tanto	wrong	when	the	target	is	
a	group.	As	such,	there	appears	little	reason	to	think	that	what	makes	public	
health	policies	(such	as	making	it	mandatory	to	wear	a	seatbelt	or	a	helmet)	
paternalistic,	where	they	are	paternalistic,	gives	us	any	moral	reason	not	to	
introduce	them.	
	
Notes	
1.	As	with	most	recent	discussions	of	paternalism	my	focus	will	be	on	cases	
involving	competent	adults.	Paternalism	towards	children	raises	different	issues.	
2.	This	feature	is	sometimes	described	by	saying	that	the	paternalist’s	intention	
or	motivation	is	to	benefit	the	other	person.	In	what	follows	‘aims’	should	be	
taken	to	include	such	accounts.	Whilst	this	is	a	feature	of	the	accounts	I	am	
considering	here	it	is	worth	noting	that	not	all	accounts	of	paternalism	include	
this	requirement	(see,	for	example,	Shiffrin,	2000).	
3.	It	needs	to	be	noted	here	that	not	all	accounts	of	paternalism	include	a	
requirement	of	this	type	(see,	for	example,	Thaler	and	Sunstein,	2008,	p.5;	Ben‐
Porath,	2010,	p.23).	
4.	In	arguing	that	Bill	benefits	in	this	way	from	the	requirement	to	wear	a	
seatbelt	being	imposed	on	him	I	am	taking	it	that	people	do	not	always	do	what	
would	be	best	for	them	even	using	their	own	assessment	of	what	is	best	for	
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them.	There	is	considerable	experimental	evidence	to	support	this	position	(see	
papers	in	Kahneman	and	Tversky,	2000;	and	Gilovich,	Griffin	and	Kahneman,	
2002).	
5.	I	would	like	to	thank	Peter	Schaber	for	pressing	me	on	this	point.	
6.	I	would	like	to	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	this	journal	for	pressing	me	on	
this	point.	
7.	My	position	here	might	be	thought	to	be	very	similar	to	that	of	Joel	Feinberg.	
Feinberg	writes,	“When	most	of	the	people	subject	to	a	coercive	rule	approve	of	
the	rule,	and	it	is	legislated	…	for	their	sakes,	and	not	for	the	purpose	of	imposing	
safety	or	prudence	on	the	unwilling	minority	(“against	their	will”),	then	the	
rationale	of	the	rule	is	not	paternalistic.”	(Feinberg,	1986,	p.20)	However,	on	
Feinberg’s	account	in	this	case	the	policy	is	not	paternalistic	because	it	does	not	
aim	to	benefit	those	who	do	not	approve	of	it,	whereas	on	mine	it	is	not	
paternalistic	because	it	aims	to	benefit	the	group	(not	merely	those	who	agree	
with	it)	and	does	so	with	their	agreement	as	a	group.		
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